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Working with the grain
Institutional bricolage
Africa
Ethiopia, Malawi and Uganda
a b s t r a c t
Despite cogent critiques and limited successes, community-based management (CBM) remains central to
policies for natural resource management and service delivery. Various approaches have been suggested
to strengthen CBM by ‘working with the grain’ of existing social arrangements and relationships. For
advocates, such approaches ensure that management arrangements are rooted in local realities and are
therefore more likely to be effective. Implementing this approach is, however, methodologically, empir-
ically, and operationally challenging. In this paper, we centre these challenges through a study of
community-managed water in rural Ethiopia, Malawi, and Uganda. We examine water management
arrangements by undertaking an in-depth social survey of 150 communities in the three countries. We
also undertake yearlong studies in 12 communities in Malawi and Uganda involving 30 diary keepers.
This focus on the local is complemented by country-level political economy analyses and district-level
sustainability assessments. Our multi-country extensive-intensive research design uncovers the flesh
and bones of CBM, and provides explanations for our findings. In Ethiopia, water management arrange-
ments are more likely to be fleshed out – fully formed committees often working in conjunction with
other institutions. In Malawi and Uganda, water management arrangements tend to be skeleton crews
of key individuals. The position we adopt is located between advocacy and critique. We recognise the
potential of working with the grain. We also recognise the considerable challenges of operationalising
this approach without reducing it to another standardised checklist or toolbox. In an attempt to reconcile
this tension, we identify practical entry points and sketch out requirements for a more socially informed,
reflexive, and effective approach to working with the grain. Whether this can be operationalised within
the logics of mainstream development, and whether it can ‘save’ the CBM model, remain open questions.
 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under theCCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Many countries have long pursued the policy of community-
based management (CBM) for natural resources. CBM is typically
operationalised through the creation of local associations, commit-
tees, groups, and organisations charged with managing the
resource in question. Nearly two decades ago, Pretty (2003, p.
1912) claimed ‘‘some 0.4 to 0.5 million groups have been estab-
lished since the early 1990s for watershed, forest, irrigation, pest,
wildlife, fishery, and microfinance management. These offer a
route to sustainable management and governance of common
resources.” Sustainability, alongside ideas of empowerment,
ownership, effectiveness, and efficiency provide a seductive narra-
tive that continues to justify the committee model of local
governance.
There is now widespread recognition that the committee model
has largely failed to deliver on its promises (Blaikie, 2006; Chowns,
2015; Etongo, Fagan, Kabonesa, & Asaba, 2018; Dill, 2010;
Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Kellert, Mehta, Ebbin, & Lichtenfield,
2000; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Saunders, 2014; van den Broek &
Brown, 2015; Zulu, 2012). Beyond this, it is argued that the
requirement to form committees, associations, and groups actually
inhibits more effective ways of working locally (Booth, 2012).
Promising alternatives are suggested by the idea of ‘working with
the grain’. From this perspective, development interventions do
not attempt to mechanically apply a particular organisational form.
Instead, the focus is on identifying and working with existing
institutions, practices, knowledge systems, and power relations
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105286
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to co-produce governance arrangements anchored in local realities
(Booth, 2009, 2012; Kelsall, 2011; Levy, 2014). Despite the poten-
tial of a working with the grain approach, there is not enough
knowledge about three key practical challenges. The first is the
methodological challenge of how to understand the ‘grain’ of local
governance arrangements. The second is the empirical challenge of
complexity, where a commitment to understanding and working
with local realities raises the spectre of seemingly endless diver-
sity. The third challenge is concerned with how best to work with
the grain, once identified.
In this article, we centre these three challenges through a study
of community-managed water in rural Ethiopia, Malawi, and
Uganda. For two reasons, focusing on CBM of rural water supply
is useful. Firstly, the rural water supply sector is an exemplar of
the committee model of CBM. Across the developing world, there
is a strong policy mandate for committees and user associations
to manage communal water supplies. Secondly, this model has
not produced the desired results. For decades, the rural water sup-
ply sector has been concerned with alarmingly high rates of non-
functional waterpoints, which at any one time stands between
15% and 60% (Banks & Furey, 2016; Foster, Furey, Banks, &
Willetts, 2020; Harvey & Reed, 2007; Lockwood & Smits, 2011;
RWSN, 2010). This issue has been dubbed a ‘hidden crisis’
(Bonsor et al., 2015). A crisis because it is so widespread, and hid-
den because it is difficult to effectively monitor and assess func-
tionality levels. The real scale of the problem tends to fly under
the radar of official statistics.
The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review literature
that has attempted tomove beyond the associationalmodel of CBM,
identifying factors that authors propose operationalise a working
with the grain approach. In Section 3wediscuss our research design,
which are argue addresses the methodological challenge to under-
stand the grain of real-world water management. Section 4 exami-
nes the findings of the research and provides a number of key
insights generated from our analysis of the data. Section 5 returns
to the factors identified from the literature review, discussing these
critically in light of our research findings. In the conclusion, we con-
siderwhat this study tells us about themethodologic, empirical, and
operational challenges just outlined. We finish with four provoca-
tions for taking forward a working with the grain approach.
2. Literature review
We review literature that has attempted to move beyond the
committee model of CBM. The first sub-section considers develop-
ments in the practice-based literature1 that recognise several of the
failings of the voluntary committee approach to managing water.
However, the alternatives suggested by these authors reflect an
ongoing preoccupation with form and formality, including with the
organisational structure of the committee itself. The second sub-
section considers analytical and practical approaches that move
beyond a preoccupation with form in order to develop ‘practical
hybrids’ for managing water that are anchored in local realities. In
the final sub-section, we identify common factors that, it is argued,
operationalise these approaches.
2.1. Form and formality
Across the developing world, CBM of water is typically opera-
tionalised through the formation of local-level committees. These
committees are voluntary associations of water users, with a pre-
scribed number of members, roles, and regularised responsibilities.
The latter includes conducting meetings, collecting money for
repair of the waterpoint, and devising and enforcing access and
use rules (Harvey & Reed, 2007, 2004; Golooba-Mutebi, 2012;
Lammerink & Bolt, 2002; Schouten & Moriarty, 2003). Since its
emergence in the late 1970s, CBM has evolved into a broad policy
initiative encompassing a number of key ideas. These include a
Demand Responsive Approach (whereby water users make key
decisions about the services they want and are able to pay for),
intended to combine financial sustainability with choice; the con-
cepts ‘empowerment’, ‘ownership’, ‘efficiency’; and the village-
level management committee itself (Behailu, Suominen, & Katko,
2015; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Naiga, Penker, & Hogl, 2015; Whaley
& Cleaver, 2017).
In more recent times, and with increasing force, both academics
and practitioners have recognised the shortcomings of this model
of CBM and argued for alternatives. In the practice-based literature,
major critiques relate to voluntarism and a lack of professionaliza-
tion of management committees; a lack of effective external sup-
port from either the government or private sector; and a failure
to account for the full lifecycle costs of a water supply system
(Foster, 2013; Koestler, 2009; Lockwood & Smits, 2011; Mcintyre
& Smits, 2015; Moriarty, Smits, Butterworth, & Franceys, 2013).
In response, as early as (Baumann, 2006) proposed ‘community
management plus’ whereby ongoing support is provided to com-
munities in the form of finances, spare parts, and technical and
managerial advice. More recently, the most widespread develop-
ment has been a call for a Service Delivery Approach (SDA)
(Lockwood & Smits, 2011; Moriarty et al., 2013). SDA considers
the whole system required to achieve sustainable rural water sup-
ply. Distinctions are made between a ‘service provider’ (the organ-
isation or operator that delivers and manages the water supply for
a defined population), and the ‘service authority’ (often a local gov-
ernment body), with legal responsibility for guaranteeing a water
service in a defined area. In some circumstances, the same body
may act both as service provider and authority. The SDA purport-
edly allows for a range of ‘contextually-appropriate service deliv-
ery models’ to achieve sustainable water supply, moving beyond
the myopic focus on village-level committees to consider the
whole system. It seeks to address existing critiques by focusing
on lifecycle costing and asset management; the professionalization
of water user committees and provision of adequate support; the
role of the private sector; and ‘accepted and enforceable norms
and standards’ (Moriarty et al., 2013, p. 338).
These developments in the practice-focused literature move the
debate towards a greater recognition of diversity, scale, and the
temporal dimension of rural waters supply systems. At the same
time, proposals such as the SDA remain wedded to normative ideas
about formal roles and responsibilities. Moreover, the literature
suggests that the organisation of interest at the local level contin-
ues to be the water user committee. For example, an IRC document
discussing ‘service delivery indicators’ in Uganda considers the
application of these indicators to the different service levels for
both point source2 and piped water schemes. At the ‘service provi-
der level’, the only indicators provided specifically assess the ‘‘Water
Source Committees’ composition, governance and performance of
duties” (van Liesholt, 2014, p. 2). Despite the critiques, an adherence
to the form and formality of the committee is remarkably tenacious
in development policy.
Approaches exist that move beyond this mainstream preoccu-
pation with form. As far back as the 1980s, the blueprint approach
1 For many decades, the literature on rural drinking water supply has been
dominated by studies, often based on specific development projects and programmes,
which aim to identify how to deliver better services. We refer to this as the ‘practice-
based literature’. Only in relatively recent times has rural water supply become of
significant interest to ‘critical theorists’ in politics, sociology, and human geography.
2 For rural water supplies, point sources are often wells and boreholes fitted with a
handpump.
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to development – epitomised by the committee model of CBM –
was critiqued for being overly simplistic, for failing to account
for context, and for overlooking the need for flexible implementa-
tion processes (Korten, 1980; Rondinelli, 1983; Therkildsen, 1988).
More recent iterations of an alternative approach include Grindle
(2004) and Grindle (2007) concept of ‘good enough governance’.
This questions the ‘‘long menu of institutional changes and capac-
ity building initiatives” that are seen as preconditions for achieving
‘good governance’ (Grindle, 2007, p. 554). As with the earlier
approaches, good enough governance instead argues for what is
feasible, achievable, and relevant in a given country context. Today,
major development players increasingly recognise the need to
think about ‘good’ or even ‘best fit’, rather than hypothetical best
practice (Ramalingam, Laric, & Primrose, 2014). The common logic
of these approaches is that an arrangement that works well in one
locality will not necessarily work well in another.
2.2. From form to function
Regarding CBM of rural water supply, the question then is how
to move from a blueprint approach in the form of the waterpoint
committee to one anchored in local realities? To answer this ques-
tion, we consider both an analytical lens for understanding how
CBM works in practice, and three cognate approaches that attempt
to operationalise the insights this lens provides. The lens in ques-
tion is institutional bricolage (IB) and the practical approaches
are facilitated institutional bricolage (FIB), working with the grain
(WWTG) and thinking and working politically (TWP).
IB is concerned with how all attempts to govern are socially
embedded, where people both consciously and non-consciously
patch together institutional arrangements from the social and cul-
tural resources available to them (Cleaver, 2002, 2012). In this
sense, it differs markedly from the more mainstream view of insti-
tutions whereby people consciously and rationally ‘build’ or ‘craft’
arrangements from scratch (Ostrom, 1990, 2005). IB is not confined
to a given programme or sectoral challenge but instead is under-
stood as a process that is happening everywhere. Research has
tended to focus on community dynamics for managing natural
resources within a village, town, or city, often situating these
arrangements within wider systems of governance (de Koning,
2011; Ingram, Ros-Tonen, & Dietz, 2015; Sandstrom, 2008;
Sehring, 2009). Attention is given to the messy and complex reality
of everyday life. From this perspective, development initiatives do
not occur in a vacuum but instead are embedded in historically
contingent relations of power and authority, and culturally specific
beliefs, values, and practices. IB helps to explain how all institu-
tional arrangements are dynamically pieced together and patchy
in varying degrees (including so-called ‘formal’ arrangements),
where these arrangements only work if they have social fit and
are regarded as legitimate (Cleaver, 2012). It also highlights the
extent to which many governance arrangements are path depen-
dent, shaped as they are by pre-existing practices, authoritative
leadership, and social inequalities (Cleaver & de Koning, 2015;
Sehring, 2009).
In some literature, an IB perspective is deployed to consider
how bricolage processes can be facilitated to produce more desir-
able development outcomes. FIB considers how development
agents as well as local people can innovate and improvise ‘arrange-
ments that work’ in specific circumstances and in relation to par-
ticular goals. Analysts focus on identifying where (in the plural
governance landscape) and when (in the planning and implemen-
tation of activities), practitioners can intervene to facilitate brico-
lage in the interests of equity and sustainability (Clement,
Suhardiman, & Bharati, 2017; Haapala, Rautanen, White,
Keskinen, & Varis, 2016; Haapala & White, 2018; Hassenforder,
Ferrand, Pittock, Daniell, & Barreteau, 2015; Merrey & Cook,
2012; Rusca & Schwartz, 2014).
This more practical orientation to IB resonates with authors
who advocate for a WWTG approach (Kelsall, 2011; Booth, 2012;
Levy, 2014). Like FIB, WWTG is intended to facilitate local
problem-solving partnerships and initiatives within a broader
institutional and policy environment that encourages such a course
of action. Booth (2012, p. 83) describes it as follows:
‘‘Unlike the usual project-inspired initiatives, the more promis-
ing initiatives do not require beneficiaries to sign up to princi-
ples of organisation of which they have little experience or
understanding. On the contrary, there is an enabling institu-
tional environment for local problem-solving initiatives that
involve whole populations, use local resources and build on
existing formal structures as well as informal relationships.”
WWTG explicitly draws upon IB to recognise the ways in which
institutional arrangements are pieced together using the social and
cultural resources to hand (Booth, 2012, p. 85). At the same time,
WWTG has clear links to TWP, which contends that development
assistance is most effective when the people designing it ‘‘better
understand the local context (‘thinking politically’) in order to sup-
port local actors to bring about sustainable developmental change
(‘working politically’)” (Hudson, Mcloughlin, Marquette, & Roche,
2018, p. 7). Emphasis is on moving beyond the many attempts to
‘render technical’ development programmes and interventions
(Li, 2007) that are inherently political (Booth & Unsworth, 2014;
McCulloch & Piron, 2019; Menocal, 2014). The remit for WWTG
and TWP is also typically a defined development programme or
intervention. Particularly for TWP, whilst the focus is purportedly
on ‘the local’, this generally signifies the national or sectoral level.
At wider scales of governance, politics and power take precedence
through a better understanding of political economy, by building
coalitions and consensus, and by working with politicians and
other actors to ‘Do Development Differently’ (Wild & Andrews,
2016).
WWTG, TWP, and FIB draw attention to sociocultural and polit-
ical realities across scales that must be accounted for to better
enact effective forms of governance. As Booth (2009, p. 3) argues,
‘‘institutions work better when they build on what exists, make
use of indigenous institutional creativity or are otherwise rooted
in their sociocultural context.” When it comes to CBM of water,
the approaches draw attention to the existence of people and insti-
tutions within a ‘multiplex’ world, where questions of water man-
agement, access, and use are woven into broader livelihood
concerns, social relations, practices, and values (Schnegg & Linke,
2015). This suggests that community interventions are not easily
compartmentalised into preformed development silos. Rather than
attempting to induce or impose a single-purpose organisational
template onto this existing reality, these approaches promise more
relevant and effective community arrangements for managing
water. The question then is how best to operationalise them?
2.3. How to work with the grain
In this section, we review the literature on WWTG, TWP, and
FIB. We find reasonably strong agreement regarding the factors
that are thought to encourage the co-production of what Booth
(2012) calls ‘practical institutional hybrids’. Factors common to
all three approaches are outlined in Table 1. Given the similarity
we observe between WWTG, TWP, and FIB, following this section
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we use the generic term ‘working with the grain’ to capture all
three approaches.
The literature on WWTG, TWP, and FIB offers suggestions for
how to co-produce more effective hybrid governance arrange-
ments. It is useful to bracket these into two phases. In the first
phase, the aim is to understand the local and wider context in
which governance arrangements are embedded. This represents a
methodological challenge, requiring a research design capable of
understanding both wider systems of governance and local socio-
cultural conditions. The second phase then requires working with
and within these conditions.
For TWP, the first phase is called ‘thinking politically’ and
necessitates a critical appreciation of the various actors, interests,
and institutional processes that characterise a given problem
domain. It is about power and politics, often at the national or pro-
grammatic level. The tool for understanding this dynamic is polit-
ical economy analysis. In the introduction to a recent special issue
on TWP, McCulloch and Piron (2019, p. 12) note that all four con-
tributing articles ‘‘confirm the importance of doing political econ-
omy” and ‘‘support the idea that careful, explicit, objective (sic)
analysis of the political, economic and social context in which
interventions or reforms are being undertaken is time well spent.”
Advocates of WWTG and FIB also recognise the importance of
understanding the political economy and more generally the need
for a robust analytical framework to investigate systemic proper-
ties. In IB terminology, analysis of wider context helps to demar-
cate the ‘institutional corridors’ in which local-level actors
operate (Hassenforder et al., 2015; Sehring, 2009). For both FIB
and WWTG, analyses of the political economy are linked to
nuanced research on the social embeddedness of local governance
arrangements. This entails a need to understand local norms, val-
ues, practices, institutions, and principal role players (Booth,
2009; Merrey & Cook, 2012; Whaley, 2018; Whaley & Cleaver,
2017).
Regarding the second phase, there is strong agreement between
WWTG, TWP, and FIB concerning how to develop practical hybrids.
Being sensitive to local conditions and wider context draws atten-
tion to the inherent complexity of most situations of interest. All
three approaches therefore stress a need to be modest and realistic
about what is possible. For Merrey and Cook, this realism denotes
that practitioners and researchers must be strategic about what
kind of change they can expect to see. The authors argue that
attempting to impose new institutional arrangements, such as the
waterpoint committee, ‘‘is ill-advised not because they are not
needed, but because they will fail” (Merrey & Cook, 2012, p. 14).
Several local level factors are seen as important for operational-
ising hybrid governance arrangements. These are a commitment
by development interventions to foster local leadership, the bro-
kering of relationships, iterative problem solving, and stepwise
learning. Proponents of WWTG and TWP have amalgamated these
factors into something of a consensus. The first authors to propose
them as an ensemble were Booth and Unsworth (2014) in a com-
parative study of seven cases. Since then, the factors identified in
this article have been affirmed by a number of other studies
(Dasandi, Laws, Marquette, & Robinson, 2019). Articles that argue
for a FIB approach also consistently identify these factors, although
not always in toto. In their study of the institutional realities of
water project implementation in rural Nepal, Haapala et al.
(2016) recognise the importance of local leadership and a
learning-by-doing approach. Creating ‘locally legitimate and
inspiring spaces’ fosters the ability of local leaders to act as change
agents. Moreover, these spaces ‘‘are gradually adjusted by contin-
uous institutional learning towards sustainability” (Haapala et al.,
2016, p. 1188). Hassenforder et al. (2015), in their study of a partic-
ipatory planning process in the Rwenzori region of Uganda,
observe how local leaders act as brokers of connection. The authors
note that this network building was central to the process of FIB.
At broader scales of governance, the literature on all three con-
cepts recognises the need for an enabling environment to facilitate
the co-production of hybrid institutional arrangements anchored
in local realities. This enabling environment comprises policies
and processes that encourage coordination and harmonization of
aid (Hickey & Bukenya, 2019), flexible and strategic funding
modalities (Booth & Unsworth, 2014; Dasandi, Marquette, &
Table 1
Factors common to WWTG, TWP, and FIB.
Factors Description
Recognise and work with
complexity
Country contexts and local realities are highly variable. Attempts to apply a uniform management model across these contexts often
fail to account for the power relations, interests, economic conditions, and moral orders within which governance arrangements
emerge. To improve CBM of water, it is important to recognise and work with this complexity rather than assuming it can be ignored
or replaced.
Enabling environment WWTG, TWP, and FIB require an enabling environment made up of relevant policies, processes, and activities. An enabling
environment promotes continuity (e.g. of government staffing), flexibility (e.g. of funding or operating procedures), and agency at the
local level. Water management policies facilitate governance processes that support local initiative and innovation to co-produce
hybrid institutional arrangements anchored in local realities.
Local leadership FIB, and to some extent TWP and WWTG, champions local leaders or ‘change agents’ in communities who are recognised as
legitimate by others. For TWP and WWTG, local leaders are change agents at the national or programmatic level. These leaders are
likely to be authority figures who act as bricoleurs, working with existing institutions and individuals in politically smart ways. Local
leaders are able to recognise and promote solutions to the most salient water-related challenges in a given context.
Brokering relationships/
network building
Local leaders broker relationships between groups and individuals to develop a network of actors who can contribute to different
water management functions. Networks comprising ‘key players’ provide greater potential for managing water through change and
uncertainty because a range of actors can be relied upon for different purposes and at different times. Such networks also promote
knowledge sharing.
Learning by doing Learning by doing is a key attribute of arrangements that work. Learning by doing includes the capacity to identify the reasons for
past failures, retain institutional memory, and solve water-related problems in an iterative manner. ‘Stepwise learning’ develops the
capacity of these arrangements to function effectively in the face of a range of potential challenges.
Realistic - recognise what is
possible
The emergence of institutional hybrids are both enabled and constrained by context. The social and cultural resources that serve as
the materials for institutions also limit what is possible. Practical hybrids are constrained by power relations, interests, economic
conditions, and moral orders in ways that may drastically curtail ambitions for desirable system attributes.
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Robinson, 2016), innovative monitoring programmes (Ladner,
2015; Venot, 2014), and that creates spaces for local initiative,
risk-taking, and collective action (Booth, 2009; Williams, Owen,
Duncan, Kingsmill, & Paterson, 2019). As noted previously, whilst
for TWP and WWTG ‘the local’ often implies the national level,
for FIB the local is typically a community in a village, town, or city.
Thus for TWP and WWTG the enabling environment may often be
the international arena, made up largely of donors and suprana-
tional institutions. For FIB, the enabling environment will more
often be a combination of district and national levels.
The factors in Table 1 suggest how community-based
approaches for developing practical hybrids can be operationalised.
Questions remain, however, about what the findings of our litera-
ture review mean in practice. What research design is able to gen-
erate knowledge of complex local realities situated in wider
systems of governance? What does this knowledge infer about
the possibility of realising the factors in Table 1? In the following
sections, we set out to answer these questions.
3. Research design
In this section, we detail how our research design sought to
address the methodological concerns our literature review high-
lighted. The focus, therefore, is on identifying real-world commu-
nity arrangements for managing water, socially embedded in
village life and broader scales of governance. The research is part
of a NERC/DFID/ESRC funded project entitled Hidden Crisis: Unrav-
elling Current Failures for Future Success in Rural Groundwater
Supply (https://upgro.org/consortium/hidden-crisis2/). Hidden
Crisis was a five-year (2015–2020) interdisciplinary research pro-
ject that aimed to develop new evidence about the causes that
underlie the current high failure rates of groundwater supplies in
Africa (see Introduction). Research was conducted in Ethiopia,
Malawi, and Uganda.
The project employed a multi-element extensive/intensive
research design (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlsson,
2002) comprising three main phases. It also commissioned a series
of country-level political economy analyses and district-level sus-
tainability assessments. In this article, we draw upon qualitative
social science data from Phases 2 and 3 of the project, as well as
the various commissioned reports. Our research design enabled
us to look beyond the WPC to understand how village-level water
management is socially embedded in existing institutions, prac-
tices, and power relations. At broader scales of governance, it
enabled us to understand the wider context, including the different
political economies of the three countries, the history of decentral-
isation reforms, and the culture of political norms.
We do not examine the Phase 1 quantitative data, which is pub-
lished elsewhere (Whaley et al., 2019). Lead social scientists from
the University of Sheffield provided ethical oversight, with the
fieldwork teams conforming to the relevant ethical requirements
of the research institutions in each country. The development
NGO WaterAid ensured ethical access to study communities in
the field, including sensitisation and mobilisation activities.
3.1. Investigating water management arrangements
Working with the grain suggests the need to move away from a
preoccupation with the formal waterpoint committee (WPC). We
therefore focused on the water management arrangement
(WMA), based not on a prescriptive set of roles and responsibilities
but on the management functions needed to ensure a sustainable
supply of water (Whaley & Cleaver, 2017). A functioning WMA
was assessed in relation to eight attributes, which in this article
we take as the criteria for understanding improved water manage-
ment. These attributes are:
1) Authoritative leadership
2) The capacity to make and enforce decisions, including rules
3) Collects or sources, manages, and accounts for funds
4) Undertakes and/or secures maintenance work
5) Represents all users in a way that ensures equitable access to
the water supply
6) Recognised as legitimate by both users and the local gover-
nance structure
7) Is aware of its roles and responsibilities and the roles and
responsibilities of others
8) Is meaningfully linked to other relevant stakeholders
Project phases 2 and 3 were concerned with understanding
WMAs, whilst embedding these arrangements within wider village
life. Phase 2 was an in-depth qualitative social survey of one hun-
dred and fifty waterpoints and their related WMAs. It was con-
ducted in conjunction with a physical science survey of the
community waterpoint (see Kebede, Fallas, MacAllister, Dessie,
Tayitu, Kefale, Wolde, Whaley, Banks, & Casey, 2019;
Mwathunga, Fallas, MacAllister, Mkandawire, Makuluni, Shaba,
Jumbo, Moses, Whaley, Banks, & Casey, 2019; Owor, Fallas,
MacAllister, Okullo, Katusiime, Berochan, Whaley, Banks, & Casey,
2019). The survey was undertaken in four districts in each of the
three project countries (Fig. 1). The individual community water-
points and their related WMAs were selected using a purposive
sampling approach. The aim was to ensure the Phase 2 dataset
investigated each of 10 waterpoint functionality categories identi-
fied in Phase 1 of the research (UPGRO, 2022).
In each country, a social science project field researcher spent
two days at each project site (three hundred days of fieldwork in
total). Each field researcher was trained by the authors in the fol-
lowing research methods: 1) participatory village mapping, 2)
group scenario exercises and one-to-one interviews with water
managers, local authority figures, and water users, 3) transect
walks, 4) collation and analysis of relevant written materials, and
5) informal discussions and participant observation. The second
survey day finished with a feedback and response session with
community members. Field researchers conducted interviews with
district water officers before and after undertaking the survey in
each project district. All methods were written up by the field
researchers on Microsoft Word (approximately five hundred docu-
ments in total). The lead author analysed Phase 2 data to under-
stand the different WMAs across the one hundred and fifty study
sites. We not only identified the different actors – groups, organi-
sations, and individuals - that make up a WMA, but the role of
these actors in village life more generally.
Phase 3 was a yearlong study of twelve communities in four dis-
tricts of Malawi and Uganda. Using participant diary keeping and a
range of qualitative social science methods - participatory map-
ping, transect walks, seasonal calendars, focus groups and inter-
views, photography - conducted by the field researchers during
quarterly visits, we tracked community members’ day-to-day
experiences of managing, accessing, and using water. This phase
provided an in-depth understanding of how a community’s rela-
tionship to water changes through the seasons and in relation to
wider livelihood concerns.
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The project employed three community diary keepers in each
site in Uganda, and two in each site in Malawi. For logistical rea-
sons it was not feasible to undertake the longitudinal research in
Ethiopia. Following training by the lead author, field researchers
provided diary keepers with initial guidance, a plastic folder with
pens and blank exercise books, and a list of factors of interest to
the study. At the same time, it was made clear that there is no right
or wrong way of keeping a diary and diary keepers were encour-
aged to write freely in their own language, capturing whatever
events and processes they wished to include. All diaries were
translated by the field researchers and written up in English on
Microsoft word. The write-ups were rigorously coded by the lead
author for themes relating to water management, access, and
use; climate and weather; health and wellbeing; livelihoods; poli-
tics, power, and governance; and social and cultural dynamics.
Finally, the authors conducted a breakout workshop and
semi-structured interviews with the three project field researchers
during a 2018 project meeting in Kampala, with subsequent follow
up questions and discussion via Skype. The aim was to ground the
emerging research findings in the experience of the field
researchers, who were nationals of each of the three project coun-
tries and who had accrued considerable experience of community
water management dynamics during their time in the field. This
allowed us to investigate some issues in more detail, whilst captur-
ing additional insights and contextual information that may not
have been formally accounted for during the fieldwork phases.
3.2. Understanding wider context
The Overseas Development Institute (ODI), a project partner,
undertook a political economy analysis (PEA) of the rural water
supply sector for each of the three project countries (Denis le
Seve, 2018; Oates & Mwathunga, 2018; Pichon, 2019). The PEAs
focused on the national and district levels, by undertaking litera-
Fig. 1. a–c: The locations of Phase 2 research sites in the three project countries.
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ture reviews, stakeholder mapping, and 16–21 semi-structured
interviews with key sector actors. The aim of the PEAs was to
understand the workings of plural institutions operating at multi-
ple scales and the distribution of power and resources among
different actors in the rural water supply sector, which has a strong
bearing on service outcomes (Cleaver, Franks, Boesten, & Kiire,
2005; Harris, Jones, & Kooy, 2011; Mollinga, 2008; Pahl-wostl,
Jeffrey, & Sendzimir, 2011). In this article, we augment these
reports with an additional review of relevant literature and our
own understanding of the political economies of the three project
countries.
WaterAid, also a project partner, commissioned a district sus-
tainability assessment (DSAs) in each of the three project coun-
tries (WaterAid, 2020). The DSAs provide meso-level insights
about district capacity, and link the broader PEAs to the fine-
grained community-level research undertaken in Phases 2 and
3. For each DSA, workshops were convened with district govern-
ment water supply and health staff, service users, handpump
mechanics, NGOs, and providers of support. Workshop facilitators
were trained by WaterAid to undertake a series of participatory
exercises using WaterAid’s District Sustainability Analysis Tool
(WaterAid, 2018).
4. The flesh and bones of community management
The previous section sought to address the methodological
challenge of understanding the ‘grain’ of local management
arrangements. In this section, we discuss the main findings of the
research, integrating data generated by the various elements of
our methodology to arrive at a number of insights. We show
how our methodology proves useful for addressing the empirical
challenge of complexity. Instead of discovering endlessly diverse
management arrangements across different cases, our findings
reveal patterns in this complexity.
Our analysis of WMAs across the Phase 2 sites reveals that
beyond the WPC there are a spectrum of actors involved in water
Table 2
Other actors involved in water management.
Country Other actors managing water
Ethiopia Iddir, Kebele, guard, church, NGO, Woreda water office, other community members with no formal roles
Malawi Village chief, councillors, MP, NGO, mosque/sheikh, health surveillance assistant, area mechanic, school/teachers, youth club, other community members
with no formal roles
Uganda LC1, LC3, and LC4 chairpersons, MP, mayor, NGO, school/teachers, sub-county chief, area mechanic, village health technician, health extension worker, other
community members with no formal roles
Terms used: Iddir is a customary form of mutual aid association; Kebele and Woreda are community and district levels of local government respectively; LC1–4 are levels of
local government with LC1 being village level and LC4 county level.
Table 3
A typology of water managers.
State-led Non-state
Individual/s e.g. chairperson of local council; village chief e.g. village elders; religious leader
Association e.g. waterpoint committee; school committee e.g. burial association; church group
Fig. 2. Water management arrangements in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Uganda.
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management (Table 2). A greater number of actors were identified
in Malawi and Uganda as compared to Ethiopia.
From this list of actors, we developed the typology of water
managers shown in Table 3. The typology is a quadrant compris-
ing two pairs of variables: 1) whether the water manager is an
individual/s or an association, and 2) whether they are state-led
or non-state actors. By state-led, we mean individuals or institu-
tions that either make up part of the architecture of the state or
that are mandated for by the state. By non-state actors, we mean
individuals or institutions that, in theory at least, exist outside
the purview of the state. Whilst this typology is imperfect, it pro-
vides some order to thinking about the different actors involved
in water management.
Fig. 2 shows the results of our analysis of WMAs across the
Phase 2 sites. Our findings suggest that CBM in Ethiopia more clo-
sely reflects the policy mandate to form a waterpoint committee
(WPC). In over 50% of sites, a fully formed WPC exists, although
often working in conjunction with other local actors. The greater
tendency in Ethiopia for communities to form WPCs is coupled
with a tendency for WMAs to develop into more elaborate
arrangements – e.g. umbrella management organisations - some-
times performing a range of functions unrelated to water (exam-
ples in the data include purchasing a mill, road repair, school
construction). These fleshed out arrangements differ from the
bare-boned WMAs typical of Malawi and Uganda, where less than
10% of sites have a fully formed WPC. Instead, more often than
not we observe a skeleton crew of key individuals managing
water. In 73% of cases in Malawi and 55% of cases in Uganda,
WMAs are comprised of one or a small number of key WPC mem-
bers, again often working alongside other actors. Our longitudinal
data lends support to this finding, where in all twelve cases there
is no fully formed WPC. Fig. 2 also shows that approximately one
sixth of WMAs in all three countries are made up only of other
actors. In both Ethiopia and Uganda, nearly a fifth of sites have
no WMA whatsoever as opposed to only 4% of sites in Malawi.
The reason for non-existent WMAs can be explained by a number
of factors, including that the waterpoint has been abandoned, or
that alternative water sources exist that are favoured by the
community.
Our analysis employed an institutional bricolage lens (see Sec-
tion 2.2) to produce a number of key insights. These insights help
to explain the difference in Fig. 2 between Ethiopia, where WPCs
exist in over 50% of sites, and Malawi and Uganda, where skeleton
crews predominate. More generally, the insights illuminate the
social embeddedness of WMAs and provide a practical grounding
for the idea of working with the grain.
4.1. Authoritarian participation
At first glance, policy and institutional reforms in Ethiopia’s
water sector appear to provide a sound explanation for the
greater prevalence of WPCs we observe. Whilst all three countries
have promoted CBM of water since the 1990s, in recent years
Ethiopia has attempted to significantly strengthen this approach,
first through its two Universal Access Plans and now the One-
WASH programme. This has entailed a large degree of integration
and collaboration across government ministries and with relevant
non-governmental actors. Encapsulated by the motto ‘One Plan,
One Budget, One Report’, the approach in Ethiopia since 2013
has been to develop a unified funding channel and to harmonise
and align activities for WASH improvement. These successive pol-
icy developments, coupled with significant donor funding, have
redoubled efforts to form and train WPCs to manage community
waterpoints.
However, looking beyond the rural water supply sector to the
broader political culture of Ethiopia suggests that additional fac-
tors explain our findings. Since the 1990s, Ethiopia has evolved a
system of federal and decentralised governance that has allowed
central government to maintain considerable power and exert
increasing control over its citizens. In part, this has been through
a massive programme of participation that has enrolled local pop-
ulations in the apparatus of the state. The very idea of participa-
tion, so central to CBM, has been distorted in this system of
governance. Instead of being a voluntary action, in Ethiopia partic-
ipation is a term often associated with little choice on the part of
the participating agents: ‘‘at the grassroots and household levels,
people are ‘participated’ into community groups for local develop-
ment work, where a failure to participate is seen as a sign of resis-
tance” (Aalen & Muriaas, 2018, p. 1). From this perspective, those
participating in WPCs are more recognisably state subjects than
citizens (Chabal, 2009).
4.2. Leakage and borrowing
At the community level in Ethiopia, our findings reveal how
oftentimes the form and functioning of WPCs depend, at least in
part, on other individuals and institutions. On the one hand, we
observe significant interpenetration whereby members of the
WPC are local authority figures active in other spheres of village
administration. Authority and meaning ‘leaks’ from one domain
to another (Douglas, 1986). A clear example are WPC members
who are also Kebele3 officials, or who are the wives to kebele offi-
cials. This imbues the WPC with authority and links it directly to
the lowest level of formal government. It simultaneously extends
the reach of local government. For example, when the WPC locks
the waterpoint to force community members to attend meetings
called by the Kebele.
Another notable water management actor is the iddir. This ‘tra-
ditional’ mutual aid institution is extremely common across Ethio-
pia and varies in form and functioning (see Box 1). What we see
clearly is the extent to which the iddir is often the cornerstone of
local efforts to manage water. Core functions performed by the
iddir appear to meld with the formal responsibilities of the WPC.
This includes recognised and respected procedures for holding
meetings, resolving disputes, and generating finances. Those cases
where we see the WPC becoming integrated into more complex
management arrangements, or performing functions beyond water
management altogether, typically occur in conjunction with, or
even at the behest of, the iddir. From an institutional bricolage per-
spective, the iddir has considerable socio-cultural legitimacy,
which can be ‘borrowed’ by the WPC and other actors to undertake
water management.
In all three countries, we also see the borrowing of legitimacy
with respect to the very idea of the WPC. In both the writings of
the diary keepers and the project’s field researchers there is con-
stant reference to how ‘the committee’ is undertaking a particular
action or activity, when in reality this refers to only one or a
small number of individuals. This is a point that was confirmed
during interviews with the three project field researchers. Whilst
a fully formed WPC may not exist in practice, the notion of a
committee still carries ideational power that can be drawn upon
to legitimise the actions of particular institutions or individuals.
In Malawi and Uganda in particular, being a member of the
WPC or saying that you are the WPC provides certain individuals
with a mandate to act. This insight parallels literature on the
ideational power of the state and the exercise of public authority
(Lund, 2006).
3 The Kebele in Ethiopia is the lowest level of formal government, similar to a ward
or neighbourhood.
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4.3. Presence and proximity
Our focus on the fleshed out WMAs in Ethiopia should not mask
the fact that there are many other instances where the bare bones
of water management exist instead. These cases are representative
of the more general picture we see in Malawi and Uganda, where
water management is typically undertaken by a skeleton crew of
key individuals. Moreover, a feature that is consistently common
to all three countries is a propensity for key water managers to live
in close proximity to the waterpoint, which may be sited on their
land. Whether these individuals had the authority to influence
the initial siting of the waterpoint, gained authority from being
near to where the waterpoint was sited, or both, varies from case
to case and is not easy to unpick. It is clear, however, that in many
ways it makes good sense to live in close proximity to the water-
point if you do perform key management functions. Activities such
as monitoring use and user dynamics, resolving disputes, locking
and unlocking the pump, and collecting fees all become signifi-
cantly harder if the waterpoint is distant. This explains why in sev-
eral cases in Ethiopia we discover communities that have been
Box 1 Three prominent actors commonly involved in water management in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Uganda.
Ethiopia: working with Iddirs
At the heart of many of the local governance arrangements we studied in Ethiopia was an informal mutual aid organisation known as
an iddir. Iddirs are widespread in much of Ethiopia, existing in rural and urban areas and across different social classes (Dejene,
2010). Previous research has demonstrated how iddirs have evolved to perform a range of social functions (Dejene, 2010; Pankhurst,
2003; Pankhurst & Mariam, 2000). Whilst these studies tend to focus on the role of the iddir as a form of social insurance, our
research suggests that in some cases its remit goes beyond this to constructing houses for poor people, repairing roads and buildings
for the community, and enforcing rules and norms (including through the application of fines). The ways in which the iddir offers
support to its members, and to the community more generally, extends beyond finance to the provision of labour (e.g. in
constructing houses or supporting members during times of sickness). In a number of our research sites, the iddir is a patriarchal
institution, probably reflecting gender relations more generally in those localities.
We observed many cases where the iddir is partially or centrally involved in the management of water in the village. Water
management functions that the iddir performs includes making and enforcing decisions concerning waterpoint management,
access and use; the financing of waterpoint construction, maintenance and repair; liaising with local government (e.g. the Woreda
water office) to commission the construction of new water infrastructure or to arrange repair works; and bestowing legitimacy
upon the mandate of the WPC, where one exists. With respect to this last point, it should be noted that a clear distinction between
the WPC (if present) and the iddir is often hard to distinguish.
Malawi: working with village chiefs
Chiefs have endured a chequered history in Malawian political life, variously incorporated into and sidelined from state-directed
functions (Zulu, 2012). Since the decentralisation policies implemented in the 1990s, the chiefs have played a role that straddles
contemporary development initiatives and customary cultural roles (Basurto, Dupas, & Robinson, 2019; Cammack, Kanyongolo, &
Neil, 2009). This hybrid role, and the significant degree of social legitimacy that they can draw on, is epitomised by their
involvement in water management.The central role of the village chief in water management can be found in many if not the
majority of our research sites in Malawi. We consistently see chiefs performing functions such as making and enforcing decisions
concerning water management, access, and use; resolving water-related disputes; providing instruction on hygiene practices and
safe use of the waterpoint; overseeing the election or selection of individuals to manage the waterpoint; collecting or raising funds
for waterpoint maintenance and repair; personally funding or loaning the funds to repair the waterpoint; acting as a form of bank
where user fees are stored; and coordinating the construction of boreholes, including organising community members to contribute
in cash or kind.
As with the iddir, the boundary between the chief and any semblance of a formal WPC, if one exists at all, is often hard to distinguish.
In a number of cases, the chief serves as one of the few active members on the WPC. Moreover, the authority of the chief is clearly
not always beneficial to equitable forms of water management, access, and use. For example, we observe several occasions where
the borehole is sited in the chief’s residency. Although even in these cases, one must be careful not to draw overly simplistic
conclusions. Literature suggests that chiefs may use their authority and local knowledge to help target development initiatives to
the poorest households and simultaneously favour their own kin (Basurto et al., 2019).
Uganda: working with the village council chairperson
During the late 1980s, Uganda implemented a radical decentralisation programme that built on a local committee system, known as
‘resistance councils’, which emerged during the civil war (1981–1986). From 1996 to 2006 increasing decentralisation reforms
accompanied decreasing electoral support for the government of president Museveni (Titeca, 2018). This trend ‘‘turned the local
governments from a radical democracy institution into a tool for patrimonialism, used mainly to mobilise support for the regime”
(Wiegratz, Martiniello, & Greco, 2018a, 2018b p. 23). The lowest political administrative unit, known today as the Local Council 1
(LC1), is embedded within administrative units at the parish, sub-county, county, and district levels (LCs 2–5 respectively). Whilst it
is not always clear from our data how active the whole LC1 committee is, the LC1 chairperson does often appear to be very present
in community affairs. This includes on matters to do with water.In many sites in Uganda we observe the LC1 chairperson
performing functions that include raising funds from community members for maintenance and repair of the borehole; making and
enforcing decisions regarding water management, access, and use; liaising with local government or NGOs to organise the
construction or maintenance of a waterpoint; lobbying external actors, such as local politicians, to raise funds or access spare parts
for borehole construction or repair work when this is beyond what the community can afford; resolving water-related conflicts.
As with the iddir in Ethiopia and village chief in Malawi, where any semblance of a WPC exists it is not necessarily clear where the line
is drawn between the committee and the LCI chairperson. Instead, it is relatively common to find one or a small number of key WPC
members and the LC1 chairperson as the only individuals actively involved in water management.
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instructed by the kebele to nominate WPC members who live near
to the waterpoint. It also explains other cases where we see the
waterpoint guard evolve into the de facto manager in all respects.
4.4. Patronage and clientelism
In Malawi and Uganda, the committee model of CBM is also
firmly entrenched in national policy. The water sectors in these
two countries have not, however, witnessed the same degree of
harmonization and integration as in Ethiopia. Indeed, in Malawi
at least, they are characterised by considerable fragmentation
and incoherence. Just as significantly, decentralisation reforms
and the overarching political culture of both countries differs
markedly from Ethiopia. Whilst also distinct in significant ways,
Malawi and Uganda both have political systems characterised by
forms of patronage and competitive clientelism. This has tended
to disrupt the normal functioning of service providers, where prac-
tical norms dictate a system based in part on dependency and alle-
giance to particular individuals. In Malawi, the large institutional
and resource gaps between government and citizens have often-
times been filled by MPs and Traditional Authorities. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that our findings suggest traditional leaders, and
particularly the village chief, is an important authority figure who
is often substantively involved in water management (Box 1). For
many of the communities we studied in Malawi there appears to
be a plurality of service delivery pathways, which includes the
Water Monitoring Assistant from the District Water Office, an area
pump mechanic, MP, or traditional leaders.
4.5. Personalisation and co-optation
In Uganda, the LC1 chairperson is a regular feature of WMAs
(Box 1). More generally, individualism is a relatively pervasive fea-
ture of the governance landscape, perhaps reflecting the strong
neoliberal forces in the country over the past three decades
(Wiegratz et al., 2018b). The transactional, monetized, and individ-
ualised character of many WMAs and of service delivery reflect a
picture whereby competitive clientelism, patronage, and marketi-
sation have promoted a spectrum of ad-hoc arrangements that
often hinge on the actions and behaviour of a small number of
key individuals. Whilst the potential for water management to pro-
mote private gain is common to all three countries, it appears to be
most common in Uganda. In several longitudinal cases, we have
clear evidence that the WPC chairperson or caretaker living near
the waterpoint benefits financially from this dynamic. In at least
two of the six Ugandan cases, waterpoint management is their only
source of income.
The ability to profit from managing the waterpoint can produce
a tension between equity and functionality. For example, in one
longitudinal case study the financial incentive of a powerful indi-
vidual to maintain the waterpoint in good working order coupled
with a stringent user fee system that the poorer members of the
community could not afford. In other cases, users who pay a higher
fee, for example those who then profit from selling the water they
draw, are favoured over regular water users. Whilst in Ethiopia,
local populations often appear more as subjects than citizens when
it comes to understanding CBM, in Malawi and Uganda they
instead more closely resemble clients. WMAs are often charac-
terised by a strong degree of clientelism whereby the notion of cit-
izenship is relegated to a secondary position in a system of
personal allegiances and exchange (Chabal, 2009).
Box 2 provides vignettes of two of the longitudinal case stud-
ies. These serve to illustrate several of the insights just
outlined.
A village in Lilongwe Rural district, Malawi
The chief, his wife, and three members of the WPC manage
the waterpoint. The chief, who is also the Group Village
Head1, enforces user payments and decides when the
season for paying money begins and ends (a decision made
in relation to the agricultural calendar). It is noted that the
chief ‘has a very big responsibility of looking after every
activity that takes place in the village’. The chief’s wife also
has a good deal of authority when it comes to managing the
waterpoint, including enforcing rules and ensuring people
pay fees. When asked about borehole upkeep, it emerges
that ‘it is the same people and one of them is the chief’s
wife’. The chief and his wife live within earshot of the
borehole. The same WPC members who manage this
waterpoint also manage another waterpoint in the village.
However, it is not clear how many of the members are
active. The chief coordinates the reciprocal use of
waterpoints between this village and a neighbouring village
when either one of them break down.
A village in Luwero district, Uganda
There is a woman who acts as both chairperson and caretaker
and the borehole is located in her compound. She has
authority and people listen to her. She is also the village
health technician. Beyond locking the borehole so that it is
only used during the daytime, the chairperson locks it to
enforce decisions or to make people attend meetings. Her
grandson, a college student, is in charge of security for the
borehole (including disciplining children who misbehave).
He sometimes takes over the duty from his grandmother of
locking the borehole and keeping the key. There is also a
treasurer. It is noted that ‘he is a good man, he is not greedy
for money and we trust him. He has never disappointed us’.
The treasurer gives people receipts when they have
contributed money towards the costs of the borehole. The
LC1 chairperson is also sometimes involved in resolving
water-related issues. The LC4 chairperson, who is rich,
personally donated a new head for the handpump. He
instructs the chairperson not to overcharge people and to
let the poorest community members take water for free.
1There are four tiers in Malawi’s system of traditional chieftaincy. The Group
Village head sits above the Village Headman and below the Paramount Chief
and Traditional Authority, respectively. The GVH oversees between two and
ten villages (Basurto et al., 2019).
In closing this section, we should note that the dichotomy
between the flesh and bones of water management that we have
offered here – the fleshed out WMAs in Ethiopia and the skeleton
crews in Malawi and Uganda - is in one sense overly simplistic. In
reality, WMAs are flesh and bone. They are not machines, perform-
ing in robotically predictable ways. Instead, like bodies, real-world
WMAs are typically organic, dynamic, and both resilient and vul-
nerable to varying degrees. They evolve in relation to changing
conditions. Moreover, these arrangements are part of a broader
system, the social body, from which they draw their sustenance
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and to which they must accord if they are to be seen as legitimate.
We now move on to discuss what the insights in this section mean
for the possibility of working with the grain to improve CBM of
water.
5. Working with the grain
Our analysis of community-managed water in Ethiopia, Malawi,
and Uganda offers useful insights into context-specific WMAs.
They suggest both opportunities and challenges for working with
the grain. In this section, we return to the factors for operational-
ising a working with the grain approach (Table 1) and consider
them in light of these insights. A general point to make at the out-
set is that our findings strongly suggest that WMAs in all three
countries form through processes of institutional bricolage (see
Section 2.2). We observe WMAs that have been pieced together
from existing sources of authority, social relations, practices, and
institutions in ways that provide at least a degree of legitimacy.
Oftentimes these arrangements save on social transaction costs
and the cognitive energy required to devise wholly new arrange-
ments. The propensity for key water managers to live in close prox-
imity to the waterpoint further underlines the energy-saving
tendency of WMAs.
5.1. Working with complexity
Our findings suggest that real-world CBM of water is indeed
complex. At the same time, they also suggest that recognising
and working with this complexity is possible. Moving beyond the
committee model of CBM is a daunting prospect because it raises
the spectre of seemingly endless diversity. However, our research
reveals a range of institutions, individuals, and arrangements com-
mon to many of the WMAs we examined in each country. Our
methodology, which concerned itself with management functions
and not management form (in the shape of a committee), and
which embedded WMAs within wider systems of governance,
was central to identifying these different actors. The focus on man-
agement functions could be used by others to identify recurring
features of WMAs in a given area or administrative unit (e.g. a dis-
trict or county). A typology of actors, perhaps similar to that in
Table 3, could be developed as the starting point for a CBM
approach that works with the grain. As we discuss in more detail
below, the various interests of these actors represent an additional
layer of complexity that must also be accounted for and worked
with. It is likely that many local government officials, extension
workers, and NGO staff are already aware of who these water man-
agers may be. To this extent, and as Booth (2012) argues, the com-
mittee model of CBM likely inhibits them meaningfully engaging
with these actors to further a water management agenda.
5.2. Context and the enabling environment
Developing a more context-sensitive approach that is able to
recognise and work with complexity suggests a very different
enabling environment to the one that characterises governance
in the countries we studied. Policies that promote politically smart,
locally led development of the sort argued for by proponents of
working with the grain are difficult to develop and even more dif-
ficult to implement. This is not only because blueprint approaches
are significantly more convenient for governments. Once a coun-
try’s political economy and practical norms for governing are
accounted for it becomes clear that any new policy initiative will
likely by subsumed by these systems, rather than transform them.
For example, in Ethiopia the idea of promoting greater flexibil-
ity, innovation, and enterprise by local actors sits uncomfortably
with the state’s attempts to constrain just such qualities in order
to exert a strong hold over local populations. At the time of writing,
Ethiopia is undergoing political change and whether flexible ways
of working locally becomemore viable is an open question. Uganda
similarly exhibits strong autocratic tendencies whereby the formal
promotion of politically smart, locally led development may strug-
gle to take root if this represents any sort of challenge to vested
interests. In all three countries, a lack of resources at local levels,
perhaps most clearly represented by the gaps in Malawi’s system
of decentralised governance, also represent a clear challenge to
an enabling environment capable of promoting a WWTG approach.
5.3. Local leaders: brokers and bricoleurs
In the places we studied, we consistently see the presence of
community leaders who are also involved in managing water.
These are typically well-recognised authority figures – be they
individuals or institutions – who use this authority to undertake
or support key water management functions. In many ways these
leaders are already ‘politically smart’ inasmuch as they recognise
and work with community dynamics on a daily basis. They are
often reasonably adept at brokering relationships, including with
actors at other scales of governance (e.g. district officials or MPs).
Yet this also represents a number of potential challenges to the
idea of working with the grain. Firstly, in cases where these leaders
are individuals, such as the LC1 chairperson or village chief (see
Box 1), much rests on their personal qualities and ambitions.
Whilst there are cases where local leaders are clearly instrumental
in managing water, there are others where their failure to pay ade-
quate attention to water-related matters results in poor or non-
functioning WMAs. This lack of interest may be symptomatic of
larger issues in the community, sometimes revolving around
entrenched poverty, inequality, and mistrust.
5.4. Embeddedness and inequality
The motives of local leaders are also complex and may vary con-
siderably. A key motivation is typically a desire to maintain power
and authority, where networks are mobilised to ensure allegiances,
loyalties, and dependencies. The idea that local leaders would bro-
ker relationships only to develop more effective WMAs is, in the
main, unrealistic. Instead, water management is typically embed-
ded in a system of social relations where the forging of new rela-
tionships or deepening of existing ones serves additional
purposes, such as extending or solidifying one’s standing in the
community. For example, a local leader may provide opportunities
for dependents to access funds generated through control of the
monthly water user fees. Alternatively, they may firm up their
power over particular individuals or factions in the community,
either by including or marginalising them from the business of
water management. Where we see a pre-existing social network,
such as the iddir in Ethiopia (see Box 1), this can provide a strong
foundation for managing water. However, these institutions are
not without their challenges, which often relate to conservative
principles of rule that leave little scope for alternative water man-
agers. Among these principles, we observe patriarchal tendencies
that relegate the decision-making power of women vis-à-vis
men, or the exclusion of people of particular faiths.
These insights speak to the issue of elite capture in participatory
development (Kyamusugulwa, 2013; Lund & Saito-Jensen, 2013)
and the question of whether to exclude or co-opt powerful actors
(Wong, 2010). Our data points to the inevitable involvement of
local elites in many instances. It also suggests that what the liter-
ature terms ‘elite capture’ is seldom clear-cut. Among other things,
elites are regularly a viable route to securing at least reasonably
effective forms of water management. This may even be the case
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when a particular individual expropriates user financial contribu-
tions for personal gain. At the same time, the influence of local
elites does tend to reproduce existing power relations and associ-
ated inequalities. It should be noted that this is often the case even
when a functioning waterpoint committee is in operation.
5.5. Learning by doing
The literature on working with the grain emphasises iterative
problem solving and stepwise learning. In the context of managing
rural waterpoints, these problems will typically relate to mainte-
nance and repair, finance, dispute resolution, and access and use
dynamics. More generally, it may relate to improving water avail-
ability in the community, for example by upgrading existing
waterpoints or constructing new ones. The crux of a learning-by-
doing approach is that over time the WMA develops the capacity
to manage increasingly substantial or ambitious challenges. In
Ethiopia, we observe several cases where the WMA has developed
the capacity to take on a range of functions. These include non-
water-related services such as road repair, school construction, or
the purchasing of a community mill. Such cases highlight the social
embeddedness of water management in wider village life, and the
multifunctional nature of institutions that purportedly exist to
address a single issue like water. In one Ethiopian case, the WPC
in conjunction with the iddir manages three separate waterpoints
and has financed the construction of a new deep well borehole. To
do this, 60% of funds came from the iddir and 40% from theWPC. At
the time of conducting our field research, the WMA was exploring
the potential of connecting this deep well to a piped network of
public tap-stands.
5.6. Brokering trust to overcome reactive problem solving
In Malawi and Uganda, we do not observe the same level of
WMA capacity. The skeleton crews that typify water management
do problem solve, often by drawing upon specific individuals both
inside and outside of the community. These WMAs may also be
multifunctional inasmuch as the individuals who comprise them
are authority figures involved in other areas of village administra-
tion. However, problem solving is seldom iterative and nor is learn-
ing stepwise. Unlike a number of cases involving iddirs in Ethiopia,
problem solving tends to be more reactive and geared towards a
minimal level of performance. In both countries, we observed a
broader spectrum of actors involved in water management
(Table 2) and our political economy analyses revealed a greater
plurality of potential service delivery pathways compared to Ethio-
pia. However, many of these actors are called upon for a single pur-
pose, such as financing a major repair job. It is the responsibility of
the key individual or individuals to perform ongoing management
functions, where there may often be a lack of trust between the
community and these skeleton crews.
A working with the grain approach would suggest that it is pre-
cisely these situations where new relationships could be brokered
to generate trust and potentially establish more fleshed out WMAs.
Brokering relationships can lead to more established management
networks and greater community buy-in. This in turn may provide
opportunities for knowledge sharing, problem solving, and collab-
orative stepwise learning that builds the capacity of the WMA.
5.7. Pragmatism and possibilities
This leads to the final factor in Table 1, which is about being
realistic and recognising what is possible. There is a tendency in
the working with the grain literature to posit a set of desirable
attributes that if in place should lead to more effective and adap-
tive forms of governance. The progression from local leadership,
to brokering relationships, to iterative problem solving and step-
wise learning offers a clear logic. However, truly accounting for
wider context and the social embeddedness of WMAs troubles this
narrative. We have seen how the clearest instances of strongly per-
forming WMAs are in Ethiopia where WPCs have been formed
under duress, village life exists in the shadow of a controlling
and autocratic state, and the reach of longstanding local institu-
tions like the iddir are crucial. In situations often typical of Malawi
and Uganda, where the state is weak or largely absent and there
are not existing village-level institutions that provide more com-
munal ways of operating, it is very hard to see how working with
the grain can lead to fleshed out, high-capacity arrangements. For
example, a notable proportion of skeleton crews in our dataset
appear to have developed around personal strategies of accumula-
tion, where particular individuals benefit financially from manag-
ing the waterpoint. Attempts to alter this arrangement will likely
disincentivise key players.
The point about pragmatism is not to rubbish a working with
the grain approach. Rather it is to suggest that it is potentially
unhelpful to hope to recreate a set of desirable factors akin to those
listed in Table 1. Ironically, this list may, like the committee model
of CBM itself, serve to impede ways of working locally. In a paper
reviewing the literature on TWP, Dasandi et al. (2019) hit home
this point. They note that although a range of studies have looked
at TWP ‘success factors’, they all tend to reproduce the factors pro-
posed in an influential 2014 comparative study by Booth and Uns-
worth. The authors argue that ‘‘this is a significant issue, because if
TWP is at its heart about illuminating contextual differences in
order to move away from ‘cookie cutter’ best practice approaches,
then we would expect to see variations”. They go on to question
whether these similarities across studies reflect ‘‘an emerging con-
sensus or if, in fact, it represents growing ‘group think’ about the
necessary programme design characteristics among TWP insiders”
(Dasandi et al., 2019, p. 158).
6. Conclusion
Working with the grain promises to improve the community-
based management (CBM) model by moving beyond the blueprint
of a local committee or association. We have argued that three
challenges relating to a working with the grain approach have
not been adequately addressed in the literature. These are a
methodological, an empirical, and an implementation challenge.
Centring these challenges through a study of community-
managed water in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Uganda has produced a
series of insights concerning the possibilities and pitfalls of work-
ing with the grain. At the same time, this research provides new
evidence of real-world community arrangements for managing
water. It strongly suggests that a focus only on formal organisa-
tions like the waterpoint committee is misguided. Fully formed
waterpoint committees seldom exist. Whether or not they exist,
water management arrangements are necessarily more complex
and dynamic. Our findings reveal how management arrangements
are pieced together from institutions, practices, logics, and sources
of authority present in a community. In Ethiopia, this often
resulted in more fleshed out management arrangements as com-
pared to Malawi and Uganda, where skeleton crews of key individ-
uals predominate.
Identifying the ‘grain’ of local governance arrangements
requires moving away from a preoccupation with organisational
form to a concern with management functions. We therefore
replaced the waterpoint committee with the concept of a water
management arrangement and the attributes that comprise it.
One way to address the methodological challenge we highlight is
through a research design that investigates both the social embed-
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dedness of local arrangements and the wider context in which they
are situated. It is likely not always practical to replicate the type of
extensive/intensive approach employed by this study. To this
extent, we argue that development actors, and especially officers
and extension workers in local government, can build on the fram-
ing and insights in this article. Importantly, these people may
already have a good idea about what the ‘grain’ is but are inhibited
by the mandate to form and train committees and user
associations.
A commitment to understanding local realities raises the chal-
lenge of empirical complexity. This concerns both the seemingly
endless diversity of possible water management arrangements,
as well as the interests of the individuals and institutions that com-
prise them. We have shown that patterns exist in this complexity
and this offers potential entry points for working with the grain.
For example, in each of the project countries we identified one
actor – an individual or institution - that was often instrumental
in efforts to manage water. Beyond this, we identified a spectrum
of other actors who were sometimes involved in water manage-
ment. We are not arguing that efforts to improve water manage-
ment focus only on the actors identified in this study. More
targeted work would be required first to verify if they are relevant
entry points. Rather, we have demonstrated that there are existing
sources of local authority and ways of working that recur fre-
quently and are clearly relevant to community management. It
would appear unwise to ignore this fact.
Having identified possible entry points, actually working with
the grain poses a further challenge. The literature suggests a num-
ber of operational factors that provide the key to addressing it.
Whilst the insights generated by our study lend some support to
these factors, they also challenged them in important ways. Work-
ing with the grain means explicitly working with local interests
and power dynamics and within a county’s wider political culture
and economy. This includes navigating the slippery issue of elite
capture. Given this, the pursuit of a set of factors that appear to
characterise success in some situations may not be applicable in
others. Indeed, this is precisely the argument put forward by pro-
ponents of a working with the grain approach.
We conclude then with four provocations that we feel are per-
tinent to a working with the grain approach. Firstly, much of the
working with the grain literature couches its thinking in the logic
of the development project or programme. There is a focus on
donors, funding, and project implementation. We instead propose
to shift focus onto the ongoing work of local governments and civil
society, and more generally onto those institutions and individuals
that are internal to the governance of a country. Secondly, we
argue for re-rendering water management as not only or even
mainly a technical exercise but a process of navigating and negoti-
ating social relations (Mapedza, Manzungu, Rosen, Ncube, & van
Koppen, 2016). Interfaces within communities and between com-
munities and local government are characterised by differences
in power, prerogatives, and knowledge systems (Long, 2001). To
work with the grain is to work with these differences. This will
inevitably involve pragmatic compromises that some find uncom-
fortable, such as the need to work with local elites in many
situations.
Thirdly, there is a concomitant need to prioritise applied social
science education among government staff at all levels but espe-
cially among those staff who actually interface with communities.
For too long the education systems of many countries have viewed
social sciences as the poor relative of the physical and natural
sciences (Asiimwe, 2018). Only the market-friendly, narrow
rational-choice framings of mainstream economics and political
science make inroads into this bias. This would seem strange given
that community management is in no small part by people and for
people. We argue that the thinking and knowledge fostered in such
disciplines as sociology and anthropology, and their application to
relevant social challenges, can invigorate attempts of government
staff to identify and work with the grain.
Finally, our research points to issues with the siloed approach to
administering development through local government. In many
countries very real practical challenges limit how and when com-
munities are visited by government staff from the relevant depart-
ment. We argue that training and resources should be invested in
those staff who do actually have relationships with communities.
In the case of water management, this need not be a representative
from the district water office. It could instead be, for example, an
agriculture or health extension worker. This would require good
communication channels and more flexible working between
departments as circumstances dictate.
It is therefore not only at the community level that the commit-
tee model serves as an impediment to more realistic ways of work-
ing. The resources local governments expend to form and train
committees that quickly disband could be better used. For exam-
ple, these funds might provide training and transport for relevant
government staff and finance ongoing work with relevant commu-
nity actors and institutions. What is clear, therefore, is that for a
working with the grain approach to gain traction in mainstream
development policy, the first step is to move beyond an ongoing
preoccupation with the committee model of local governance.
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